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Book review
Hayek’s Challenge: an Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek
Bruce Caldwell
Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. xi + 489, $55.00 hardcover
ISBN 0-226-09191-0
This  is  a  challenging  work;  indeed  the  reader’s   challenge   starts   with   the   title.    Hayek’s
Challenge is subtitled ‘an intellectual biography’ of Hayek, and the publisher describes  it  as  ‘the
first full intellectual biography’ of Hayek (front flap).  But Caldwell himself  appears  to  disagree:
it was ‘never my goal’ to write ‘a comprehensive intellectual biography’ (177, note  10).   Further,
the book has a ‘secret title’: Caldwell’s Challenge (4).  To assess  what  Caldwell  has  done,  it  is
important to be very clear  about  what  he  was  trying  to  do.   Caldwell  spells  out  in  detail,  in
engaging  autobiographical  passages,  that  his   own   interest   is   very   much   in   the   area   of
methodology; and Hayek’s Challenge is an intellectual biography in a very precise  and  restricted
sense:  specifically,  it  is  a  methodological  history,   an   account   of   Hayek’s   search   for   an
understanding of scientific method adequate for the investigation of complex spontaneous  orders.
The story told is of Hayek’s journey from ‘Austrian presuppositions’ to ‘a place that  was  unique’
(12).  Hayek’s contributions to politics, economics, psychology, and so on, are brought in  only  to
the extent that they are  required  to  illustrate  and  explain  Caldwell’s  methodological  narrative.
Once  this  is  understood,  Caldwell’s  concentration  on  certain  issues,  and  relative  neglect   of
substantial aspects of Hayek’s legacy – which would certainly betray severe lack  of  balance  in  a
‘comprehensive’ intellectual biography  –  become  understandable  and,  indeed,  in  my  opinion,
wholly justified.  
The nature of the project explains the structure of the work.  The book consists of  an  introduction
and three parts: a prehistory of Hayek, introducing us to  the  Austrian  school  of  economics;  the
main  story  of  ‘Hayek’s  Journey’;  and  a  final,  results-and-prospects  section.   The   first   part
documents the emergence of the Austrian school through struggle with its intellectual  antagonists
– historicists, positivists and socialists.  Caldwell highlights the contributions of Menger and  Max
Weber.  This long – five chapters and more than a hundred pages  –  scene-setting  operation  is,  I
think, both necessary to understand the  subsequent  specifically  biographical  story,  and  also  an
original contribution to our understanding of  the  Austrian  school.   The  story  is  also  well-told.
This sets the scene for the following part, the  core  of  the  book.   ‘Hayek’s  Journey’  consists  of
eight chapters on the phases of Hayek’s  methodological  development,  from  his  methodological
starting points of the early years in Vienna and at the LSE, to the  preoccupation  with  complexity
and evolution characteristic of his mature standpoint.  Part III, ‘Hayek’s Challenge’  consists  of  a
retrospective and appraisal of Hayek’s ‘multiple legacies’, and a final chapter  in  which  Caldwell
shows  how,  he  believes,  Hayek’s  contributions  to   methodology   illuminate   the   history   of
twentieth century economic thought.
A number of points may be made in  appraisal  of  Caldwell’s  achievement.   On  the  credit  side,
Caldwell, who is also the  general  editor  of  Hayek’s  collected  works,  is  extremely  knowledge
about his subject matter, and is profoundly in sympathy with it.  Moreover, he is a congenial story-
teller and the narrative flow carries the reader effortlessly along.  Given the inherent difficulties of
the material, this is  a  signal  achievement.   This  is  in  fact  a  book  which  Hayek  scholars  and
students will need to refer to, and indeed undoubtedly  will  refer  to,  with  pleasure,  for  years  to
come.
On the debit side, we are faced with a number  of  issues  involving  the  critique  of  Hayek.   It  is
perhaps asking too much to expect a biographer to deal with every aspect  of  the  criticism  of  his
subject which has been raised, but even so, this  book  seems  to  me  to  be  very  light  on  critical
reflection on Hayek.  Throughout the book,  Caldwell  insists  that  he  wants  to  ‘make  sense’  of
Hayek, implying that this is something that Hayek’s critics do not want to do (5).  ‘In part  2  …  I
seldom paused to assess his substantive claims.  Rather, I focused on making sense of the journey’
(323).  Part 3 ostensibly sets  out  to  remedy  this.   Ch  14,  ‘Journey’s  End  –  Hayek’s  multiple
legacies’,  presents,  despite  the  apparent  implication  of  its  title,  ‘an  assessment   of   Hayek’s
methodological legacy’, with other issues only dealt with  to  the  extent  that  an  appraisal  of  the
methodological legacy involves commenting on his contributions to other fields (323).
Given that this chapter is a summary by a leading Hayek scholar of Hayek’s  contributions  to  the
question of what constitutes truly scientific study of organic  society,  the  modesty  of  Caldwell’s
claims on Hayek’s behalf is quite remarkable.  It does seem to me that he damns  Hayek  with  the
faintness of his praise.  Every so often he confesses that ‘Hayek’s recourse to history must  appear
a little disingenuous’ (328), ‘There was a blunderbuss quality  to  Hayek’s  attack’  (340),  ‘Hayek
clearly did not succeed’ in providing ‘a finished political philosophy’ (347), ‘Putting the best  face
on it … Hayek’s reconstruction of the process of cultural evolution … was … incomplete.’  (355),
and so on.
Mostly, however, it is what Caldwell doesn’t say which  raises  eyebrows.   Caldwell  sets  out  his
appraisal of Hayek’s methodological contribution in nine sections – monetary theory and the trade
cycle, Robbins and Hayek, ‘Homo Economicus’, “Economics  and  Knowledge”,  the  “Scientism”
essay,  the  Sensory  and  other  orders,  Hayek’s  political  theory,  cultural  evolution  and   group
selection, and the theory of spontaneous orders.  In almost every case, Caldwell’s  final  verdict  is
strangely muted.  On monetary theory and the trade cycle, Caldwell reports Hayek’s view that any
such theory should be based on four methodological precepts, of which the only one  commanding
significant  assent  today  is  the  very  one  which  Hayek   himself   later   dropped,   namely   the
requirement that macro theory should have micro foundations in general equilibrium theory (327).
 On Hayek’s encounter with Robbins, Caldwell concludes  that  he  ‘suspects’  that  Hayek  shared
Robbins’s  view  of  Mises,  ‘but,  as  usual,  compelling  evidence  is  hard  to  find’  (329).    The
inconclusive section on ‘Homo  Economicus’  hardly  mentions  Hayek  at  all.   The  next  section
argues that ‘Hayek’s varied insights into the “knowledge problem”  probably  constitute  his  most
enduring legacy in economics’, but Caldwell does not assess  that  contribution,  merely  reporting
his own ‘inclination’ to think that the central  Austrian  contribution  is  the  critique  of  socialism
(338).  Caldwell concludes the section on a very weak note by conceding  that  everyone  involved
in the socialist calculation debate,  Hayek  included,  took  an  ideological  stance,  but  suggesting
without further discussion that  Hayek’s  ideological  stance  was  ‘more  perceptive’  (339).   One
could continue.
Mostly, Caldwell does not consider criticism of Hayek – after all, in his view,  the  critics  are  not
trying to ‘make sense’ of him – but in one or two  places  Caldwell  does  attempt  a  defence.   An
instance concerns Hayek’s adoption of a group selection mechanism to underpin  his  evolutionary
theory.  It is remarkable that Caldwell can set out precisely  what  is  wrong  with  group  selection
(353), and still defend Hayek on the next page.  The problem is  that  in  the  competitive  struggle
between groups,  groups  of  altruists  are  vulnerable  to  subversion  from  within  by  individuals
adopting  a  self-seeking   strategy.    In   Maynard   Smith’s   terms,   altruist   strategies   are   not
‘evolutionarily stable’.  Hence even if groups of altruistic individuals would do better than  groups
of  selfish  individuals,  such  competition  between  groups  cannot  get  started.   To  believe  that
individuals will act in the social interest, rather than their own, contradicts the rational,  materialist
kernel of methodological individualism,  that  social  outcomes  have  to  be  consistent  with  self-
seeking individual behaviour.  Caldwell’s  response  is  weak  in  the  extreme:  ‘Because  Hayek’s
conception  of  the  individual  allowed  for  considerably  more  complex  human  responses,   his
framework  is  less  susceptible  to  this  objection   [ie,   that   self-seeking   individual   behaviour
undermines group selection].’ (354)  ‘Hayek was never a doctrinaire methodological individualist.
 He was willing to seek explanations on many different levels … there is no inconsistency’  (356).
Even if Hayek were right that individuals might act in an altruistic manner, as  Caldwell  seems  to
suggest here, how could they possibly know what it was in the interest of society for them  to  do?
On Hayek’s account, they only have knowledge specific to their  circumstances  and  do  not  have
access to the big picture, to knowledge of society as a whole.  The issue of group selection is  thus
a major problem for the appraisal of Hayek’s methodological standpoint, and  Caldwell’s  account
does little to rescue Hayek’s approach.
Group selection is closely, indeed  intimately,  connected  with  the  issue  of  ‘Panglossianism’  in
Hayek.  Caldwell writes:
“The price system alone is not enough to explain the  coordination  that  we  observe;  it  is
only one of a  number  of  social  institutions  that  help  coordinate  the  actions  of  market
participants.  Hayek’s later work in political philosophy was, in part,  designed  to  identify
the fuller set of institutions whose presence would create an environment that  would  least
hinder the coordination of knowledge.  The phrasing least hinder is intentional – there was
nothing Panglossian in Hayek’s vision.” (338)
“Hayek never claimed optimality for markets.  This is why I  characterized  him  earlier  as
seeking that set of institutions that least hinder coordination.”  (349)
But this is illogical.  Talk of sets of  institutions  ‘least  hindering’  something  implies  either  that
every set hinders it to some extent, or we are only  interested  in  those  that  hinder  it.   Surely,  if
every set of institutions hinders agent coordination, the set which hinders it least is optimal;  if  on
the contrary some sets promote coordination, to focus on the set that  ‘least  hinders’  it  would  be
perverse.  The premise, that every set of  institutions  hinders  coordination,  is  also  meaningless:
hinders coordination relative to what?  Something – X –  can   only  be  said  to  hinder  something
relative to a situation in which  X  is  absent.   Where  did  Hayek  ever  suggest  that  coordination
would be better in the absence of institutions?  Hayek did not believe that: he clearly believed that
institutions enabled coordination and some sets did it better than others.   And  Caldwell  concedes
the point: on the previous page he says ‘Market prices permit … knowledge to be used  by  others,
thereby assisting in the mutual coordination of plans… The price system … is … one of a number
of  social  institutions  that  help  coordinate  the  actions  of   market   participants.’   (337   –   my
emphasis.)   Again:  Hayek’s  ‘preferred  approach  was  to   examine   the   sorts   of   institutional
arrangements  that  …  might  best  allow  individuals  to  coordinate  their  actions’  (333   –   my
emphasis).  So Hayek did not believe that institutions hinder coordination, he believed that at least
some institutions aided coordination, and he was concerned – as indeed are we all  –  with  the  set
that does the best job.  There’s  nothing  Panglossian  about  that.   The  Panglossianism  comes  in
when  Hayek  argues  that  spontaneous  forces  –  in  particular  the  group-selection  evolutionary
process – are intrinsically human-favourable and tend to generate the optimal  sets  of  institutions
we’re looking for.   Caldwell  concedes  (356)  that  it  would  be  natural  for  Hayek’s  readers  to
conclude that his descriptions of the emergence of markets are accompanied by normative  claims;
in other words, that he commits the  naturalistic  fallacy.   However,  according  to  Caldwell,  this
would be mistaken – ‘as  Whitman  (1998)  has  carefully  documented’.   But  Whitman’s  (1998)
paper in Constitutional Political Economy has been criticised in the  same  journal  (Denis,  2002),
and his claim that Hayek avoided the naturalistic  fallacy  cannot  be  accepted.   Rather,  once  the
passages Whitman cites are read in context,  the  ‘Panglossian’  interpretation  of  Hayek  becomes
even stronger.  In sum, Caldwell’s defence of Hayek on the issue of the Panglossian results  of  his
group-selection evolutionary theory is far from convincing.
The bottom line is this: Caldwell interprets Hayek’s methodological development as a  pilgrimage
starting from standard Austrian assumptions,  and  ending  up  somewhere  unique  (12).   On  this
journey he was driven by the goal of developing a scientific approach to the study of  society  as  a
complex system, an approach which would provide intellectual support for  capitalism.   Now  the
question is, whether in fact he ever reached this goal, or was still searching for it at the end  of  his
life?  Was Hayek’s final view, really his final view,  or  just  as  far  as  he  had  happened  to  get?
Caldwell doesn’t answer this critical question.  To do so he would  need  to  examine  whether  the
forces which had carried Hayek so far, were now finally reconciled, and the journey over.
Andy Denis
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